Zero permission android applications - attacks and defenses

Google advertises the Android permission framework as one of the core security features present on its innovative and flexible mobile platform. The permissions are a means to control access to restricted AP/s and system resources. However, there are Android applications which do not request permissions at all.In this paper, we analyze the repercussions of installing an Android application that does not include any permission and the types of sensitive information that can be accessed by such an application. We found that even app/icaaons with no permissions are able to access sensitive information (such the device ID) and transmit it to third-parties

Mitigating man-in-the-middle attacks on smartphones – a discussion of SSL pinning and DNSSec

Since their introduction, smartphones remain one of the most used handheld devices and this trend is predicted to continue in the coming years. Consequently, the number of attacks on smartphones is increasing exponentially; current market research shows that data traffic generated by smartphones will escalate by tenfold in 2019. Such an increase in traffic indicates that the smartphone industry will remain an attractive target for attackers. Whilst smartphone users are aware of the benefits of installing antivirus applications for malware evasion, they have limited knowledge on how to mitigate MiTM attacks. Furthermore, application developers do not always consider implementing appropriate security checks as an important step during the development stage. In this paper, we describe MiTM attacks based on SSL and DNS and provide a discussion on how they can be mitigated using SSL Pinning and DNSSec. We complete our discussion on mitigation of MiTM attacks by including challenges, limitations and recommendations for application developers and smartphone users. In particular, we suggest that application developers pass a certification test regarding their use of SSL Pinning and/or DNSSec.

Security and privacy of users\u27 personal Information on smartphones

 This research investigated the proliferation of malicious applications on smartphones and a framework that can efficiently detect and classify such applications based on behavioural patterns was proposed. Additionally the causes and impact of unauthorised disclosure of personal information by clean applications were examined and countermeasures to protect smartphone users’ privacy were proposed

Where's Crypto?: Automated Identification and Classification of Proprietary Cryptographic Primitives in Binary Code

The continuing use of proprietary cryptography in embedded systems across many industry verticals, from physical access control systems and telecommunications to machine-to-machine authentication, presents a significant obstacle to black-box security-evaluation efforts. In-depth security analysis requires locating and classifying the algorithm in often very large binary images, thus rendering manual inspection, even when aided by heuristics, time consuming. In this paper, we present a novel approach to automate the identification and classification of (proprietary) cryptographic primitives within binary code. Our approach is based on Data Flow Graph (DFG) isomorphism, previously proposed by Lestringant et al. Unfortunately, their DFG isomorphism approach is limited to known primitives only, and relies on heuristics for selecting code fragments for analysis. By combining the said approach with symbolic execution, we overcome all limitations of their work, and are able to extend the analysis into the domain of unknown, proprietary cryptographic primitives. To demonstrate that our proposal is practical, we develop various signatures, each targeted at a distinct class of cryptographic primitives, and present experimental evaluations for each of them on a set of binaries, both publicly available (and thus providing reproducible results), and proprietary ones. Lastly, we provide a free and open-source implementation of our approach, called Where's Crypto?, in the form of a plug-in for the popular IDA disassembler.Comment: A proof-of-concept implementation can be found at https://github.com/wheres-crypto/wheres-crypt

A comparison of the classification of disparate malware collected in different time periods

It has been argued that an anti-virus strategy based on malware collected at a certain date, will not work at a later date because malware evolves rapidly and an anti-virus engine is then faced with a completely new type of executable not as amenable to detection as the first was.In this paper, we test this idea by collecting two sets of malware, the first from 2002 to 2007, the second from 2009 to 2010 to determine how well the anti-virus strategy we developed based on the earlier set [18] will do on the later set. This anti-virus strategy integrates dynamic and static features extracted from the executables to classify malware by distinguishing between families. We also perform another test, to investigate the same idea whereby we accumulate all the malware executables in the old and new dataset, separately, and apply a malware versus cleanware classification.The resulting classification accuracies are very close for both datasets, with a difference of approximately 5.4% for both experiments, the older malware being more accurately classified than the newer malware. This leads us to conjecture that current anti-virus strategies can indeed be modified to deal effectively with new malware.<br /

Systematic Classification of Side-Channel Attacks: A Case Study for Mobile Devices

Contains fulltext : 187230.pdf (preprint version ) (Open Access

TLS → Post-Quantum TLS: Inspecting the TLS landscape for PQC adoption on Android

The ubiquitous use of smartphones has contributed to more and more users conducting their online browsing activities through apps, rather than web browsers. In order to provide a seamless browsing experience to the users, apps rely on a variety of HTTP-based APIs and third-party libraries, and make use of the TLS protocol to secure the underlying communication. With NIST\u27s recent announcement of the first standards for post-quantum algorithms, there is a need to better understand the constraints and requirements of TLS usage by Android apps in order to make an informed decision for migration to the post-quantum world. In this paper, we performed an analysis of TLS usage by highest-ranked apps from Google Play Store to assess the resulting overhead for adoption of post-quantum algorithms. Our results show that apps set up large numbers of TLS connections with a median of 94, often to the same hosts. At the same time, many apps make little use of resumption to reduce the overhead of the TLS handshake. This will greatly magnify the impact of the transition to post-quantum cryptography, and we make recommendations for developers, server operators and the mobile operating systems to invest in making more use of these mitigating features or improving their accessibility. Finally, we briefly discuss how alternative proposals for post-quantum TLS handshakes might reduce the overhead

Towards an understanding of the impact of advertising on data leaks

Recent investigations have determined that many Android applications in both official and non-official online markets expose details of the user\u27s mobile phone without user consent. In this paper, for the first time in the research literature, we provide a full investigation of why such applications leak, how they leak and where the data is leaked to. In order to achieve this, we employ a combination of static and dynamic analysis based on examination of Java classes and application behaviour for a data set of 123 samples, all pre-determined as being free from malicious software. Despite the fact that anti-virus vendor software did not flag any of these samples as malware, approximately 10% of them are shown to leak data about the mobile phone to a third-party; applications from the official market appear to be just as susceptible to such leaks as applications from the non-official markets